The US ceasefire agreement with Iran has created a political crisis for Israel's prime minister, dismantling the three pillars of Benjamin Netanyahu's political career and leaving him ensnared in a fresh security predicament.
How can the individual who portrayed himself as Washington's political confidant, wielding genuine sway over American politicians, be so thoroughly marginalized and so openly humiliated by his crucial US partner?
How can the figure who prioritized confronting Iran as the core of Israel's security strategy conclude the war with Iran arguably in a more advantageous position?
And how can his worn, damaged political reputation as Israel's "Mr Security" withstand the US and Iranian demand that Israel stop attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon, just months before an Israeli general election?
The choices now confronting Netanyahu are unfavorable. Opposition leader Yair Lapid summarized them in the Knesset on Monday as "either a direct and destructive clash with our greatest ally, or a submissive yielding of Israeli interests."
US President Donald Trump's profanity-laced criticism that Netanyahu showed poor judgment in ordering a strike on Beirut on Sunday has been exploited by his political opponents and media pundits, who are already concentrating on the election that must occur before the end of October.
However, remarks from members of Netanyahu's own Likud party, as well as far-right cabinet ministers in his governing coalition, also highlight the pressure he faces from his own camp—most acutely regarding Tehran's insistence that the ceasefire encompass "military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon."
"Trump's agreement does not obligate us," Israel's far-right national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, wrote on social media on Monday. "We are not party to this deal that does not guarantee our security."
"Israel will continue to defend itself," Likud lawmaker Ariel Kallner informed me, though he declined to clarify whether that meant Israel would persist with its attacks.
"We will do what is necessary. And we expect our friends to comprehend us," he stated. "Sometimes disagreements occur between allies, and allies should also grasp their allies' situations when they are at risk."
Sima Shine, a former Mossad official and Iran expert, commented: "It's hard to understand why the Americans accepted this."
"By permitting Iran to decide what occurs in Lebanon, the US is giving Iran the opportunity to keep backing Hezbollah and to ensure Hezbollah remains a significant political force in the Lebanese landscape."
"Israel is unhappy with that—neither the security establishment nor the political sphere," she added.
Amid the uproar of criticism and anger from across the political spectrum, Israel's prime minister himself has so far remained silent. Often quick to declare victory, his current quietness has been interpreted by some as an indication of the challenge he faces in determining his next moves.
Security has been the foundation of Netanyahu's appeal to voters for decades. That is an increasingly tough message to convey.
His reaction to the devastating Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 was to pivot Israel's security policy toward a more aggressive stance—anticipating threats rather than managing them.
Reshaping the Middle East by eliminating the threats Israel faced was his answer to that crisis.
But even though Israeli forces have devastated much of Gaza and killed over 73,000 people, according to the Hamas-run health ministry, Hamas still controls half the territory and is reasserting its influence there. Meanwhile, a US-brokered peace plan and a US-appointed administration for Gaza remain stalled, eight months after Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire.
Netanyahu's revised security approach has left Israeli forces occupying large parts of Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. This is popular with many Israelis and is unlikely to conclude before the election, but it is also straining Israel's military resources and reservists to their limits, with no clear diplomatic exit strategy.
Repeated rounds of conflict with Hezbollah and the Iranian regime have not neutralized Israel's primary adversaries, but have instead left Tehran under more hardline leadership, with less fear of US-Israeli power and greater influence through the Strait of Hormuz.
Now, Israel's arch-enemy appears to be the one exerting influence over Israel's key ally.
"Israel's failure necessitates a renewed evaluation of its strategy toward Tehran. [It] must develop more realistic and restrained priorities," according to Danny Citrinowicz, a senior Iran researcher at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
"Any Israeli military action perceived in Washington as an effort to undermine the agreement is expected to face a harsh response from the US," he wrote in an article for the daily newspaper Israel Hayom.
"Unlike during the Obama administration, when Benjamin Netanyahu could attempt to circumvent the White House by rallying support in Congress and among US public opinion, those options barely exist at this time."
Netanyahu's pitch to Israeli voters has long been that his policies and political acumen offer the best defense against regional dangers; that promise increasingly seems overtaken by events.
Regime change in Iran might have salvaged his political image and his election narrative. Instead, his new security strategy has left him confronting the dilemma of either confrontation or capitulation—not with an enemy, but with an ally.